Gender Pragmatism in Extremism

Ola Saleh

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Introduction:

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 notes that women are disproportionately affected by violence during conflict, and have in many places played important roles in efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict and violence, and rebuild the resilience of affected communities. On the other hand, women have been actively engaged in violent extremist groups involved in conflict zones where their roles varied from mobilizing support and recruitment to these groups to performing terrorist attacks as suicide bombers. Over the last decade women have participated in over 38 non-international armed conflicts and violent international disputes.

According to Speake, B. (2013), even a genuine gendered approach as understood by the UN and other peacebuilding community actors could fail to build a sustainable peace as it does not adequately address structural inequalities, power dynamics, and the fundamental economic inequalities created by the global neoliberal macroeconomic structure which also perpetuate violence and conflict.

De Mel (2002) points out that ‘acts of victimhood of female suicide bombers are transformed into agentive moment, and mark their protagonists as those who have broken rank, dispensed with or reinvented tradition and re-drawn their roles in society’. Conversely, Jihadist movements simultaneously uphold and reinforce prevalent gender constructions through the reproduction of conventional cultural standards, preventing women from meaningful empowerment. Women empowerment is a means of community mobilization and fostering resilience to violent extremism, but the question is; does gender matter? That is, do the politics of masculine and feminine gender archetypes matter for the ways in which people engage in violence and the ways peace organizations approach conflict resolution issues? Does gender matter more in religious contexts, namely Jihadist groups?

According to the EU-wide Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) best practices collection Preventing Radicalisation to terrorism and Violent Extremism: “Strengthening the EU’s Response, the nature of the phenomenon requires to work with a broad range of partners to gain a better understanding of the behaviors and tactics, and to mitigate or prevent that activity” (RAN, 2014). RAN is divided into working groups, RAN supported two conferences on women in extremism (Womex), however, gender is not represented in a separate working group.
Fink (2010) finds that ‘international initiatives to counter terrorism and militancy have more often than not been directed at the military aspects of such threats, with insufficient attention paid to the specific context—the social, political, and regional dynamics—in which they evolve’

“Women’s participation has evolved from auxiliary roles supporting their male counterparts, to gathering intelligence, providing healthcare, and maintaining safe houses, to direct engagement in violent acts, including suicide bombings” Hearne's (2009) ’The Role of Women in Terrorism’ explains in (Carter 2007, p. 6) This paper explores gender dynamics in white supremacist and Jihadist movements in an attempt to feedback into practice a better understanding of gender related issues in interventions.

**Contextual Framework:**

Framing women within their gender roles as victims/having blueprint for peace, on the one hand undermines their active role in violent extremism as perpetrators and on the other hand shifts the focus from fundamental structural injustices towards women, in this case, to protection or prevention which leads discussions to be focused around the need for gendered approaches, marginalizing the context and background information of each individual case. For this end, this paper differentiates between two terms “gendered-approaches” and “gender-sensitive approaches”, the first meaning developing interventions based on gender and the second meaning developing gender aware interventions whose main start point is the context not the gender of the target group.

The research was conducted in Sweden, with participation of practitioners, religious leaders and former extremists from the US, Norway, Syria.

The methodology of this project is a mixed research. The project is analytical and the samples of the research are purposive due to the nature of the subject and samples.

Structured interviews have been conducted with some religious leaders to examine their views on the role of gender and women in Jihadist groups, the responses are compiled and explored as to whether they are reflected or countered in recruitment narratives. Then a comparative analysis of the white power movement and Jihadist literature will be undertaken in an attempt to find similarities and departure points, in addition to formulating recommendations for the formation of disengagement alternative narratives. Then exploring the motivations for joining these groups and look into the gender relevant aspects, what are the shared and different motivations for both genders and are they driven by gender roles or individual driving forces. how the male members view the role of the female members in their groups.
Objectives:
This paper comparatively looks into gender dynamics in recruitment to/dischare, from right-wing extremist groups and Jihadist groups. The focus is on female members of the white power supremacist movement and female recruits to Jihadist groups from the EU and the US. Then works towards developing practical tools for first line practitioners on the gender variable in interventions. The research results were communicated to the RAN derad working group for further follow up and dissemination amongst first line practitioners and policy makers.

Gender discourse in recruitment narratives
Scholarly studies of the white power movement have researched its racist and anti-Semitic ideologies, however the role of gender in its ideology was under discussed.
In the White power discourse, interracial sexuality is considered the ultimate abomination; images of white women stolen by black men are the ever present symbol of that threat (Ridgeway 1990) these images strikingly contrast images of active and sexually independent women as portrayed by women movements. Kimmel (2013) explains that the white supremacist discourse depicts white women as passive victims at the hands of men from other races and require white men's protection. The protection of the race is achieved through the protection of white womanhood and therefore gender is placed central in the movement's discourse. The White identity is a gendered identity; the heterosexual white man is responsible for the protection of the Aryan race and the heterosexual white woman is responsible for the support of the white man and the continuation of the Aryan race.
This gendered identity creates a central chivalrous role of the male as the savior of the race and creates a pseudo need for protection in the minds of its female recruits who, driven by “patriotic duty”, take on the responsibility to be the vessels of the white race and producer of more Aryan chivalrous children.
For this project a number of interviews (see appendix A) have been conducted with former white supremacists who were asked the questions: Did men and women play different roles in the group? What were they? How did you feel about that?

Interviewee 1: A former male US white power activist who joined the group in his mid 20s said: “Yes. Men worked; women took care of children and home. [I] thought that was how it was supposed to be.” this statement indicates the patriarchal heteronormative gender roles as the mainstream in the group.

Interviewee 2: A former US white power activist who joined the group as a teenager answered: “While there always were a few outspoken/strong women (one of whom founded our skinhead gang with me and my best friend who dated her), most of the leadership was left to males. The standard role of a female was to be subservient to the males and support their violence, as well as to bear and raise children.” This answer
speaks for the power positions of masculinity and femininity, and centrality of the female body to her role.

**Interviewee 3:** A former Swedish white power activist who joined the group in his teens: “The group was a male-only-group. The few females that was around the group were primarily girlfriends. It was not said straight out but we were thinking about men as the one's with agency, who were the activists, fighters, soldiers, politicians and leaders. The role of woman was primarily as partners or (in more symbolic terms since no one had children) as mothers. At that point it felt just natural. The cause and our movement was all about a militarized, male idealized war with the perceived enemies of our cause.” In another interview of interviewee 3 with the Free Initiative¹, he stresses that being chosen and feeling superior were attractive to join the group. We can read in this answer a passive and absent depiction of women in the group, and normalization of the patriarchal values of the group. An impression shared by the other male interviewees. Kimmel (1994) writes about manhood in the white power movement: “The hegemonic definition of manhood is a man in power, a man with power, and a man of power, we equate manhood with being strong, successful, capable, reliable, in control. The very definition of manhood we developed in our culture maintain the power that some men have over other men, and that men have over women.”

On the other hand, one female interviewee expressed different views of herself and the role of women in the group. 

**Interviewee 4:** A former US female white power activist who joined the group in her teens says: “Men made up the majority of leadership roles. I felt that, as a female, I could make a lasting mark with my contributions and prove that I could be just as valuable as the men.” A statement with which Karen Winther, director of (The Betrayal, 2011), an autobiography of her journey in extremism, agrees that the movement at some point was a platform for self-actualization and empowerment. Even though women could see that leadership consisted mainly of men, they still had a false self image of their feminist realization while in fact they were serving and spreading the patriarchal values of the group.

In an attempt to Explore Jihadist discourse I present Omayma Al-Zawahiri's missive entitled “Letter to my Muslim sisters”, she says: Women are ‘content with the honors God has bestowed upon [them]; He elected [them] from among all his servants by blessing [them] with [being part of] jihad in His path to make His religion triumphant and make His word supreme.’ She reminds herself and her fellow female jihadists of the female Companions who fought alongside the Prophet Muhammad and showed more courage than many

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¹Far Right extremism, The Human Face. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQfQfT3wsmQ
men at the time. Most of Umayma al-Zawahiri’s missive is dedicated to all other Muslim women. To begin with, she calls on them to observe Islamic law, especially to maintain their commitment to donning the veil. The campaign against the veil, she explains, represents the most intense battle between Islam and unbelief (kufr). In her mind, abandoning the veil is the thin end of the wedge: ‘if a woman were to abandon [the modesty] of her appearance and covering herself, this is [necessarily] followed by a series of other [neglects] that push her away from her religion.’ (Lahoud, 2010). Then she highlights their roles as wives, mothers who should raise their children on the love of Jihad, recruiters and fundraiser. This missive, just like in the white power activist answers above, creates a false picture of women agency when giving the examples of the female Companions of the Prophet Mohammad in one line but focusing most of the letter on abiding by the strict rules on female attire/body and submissiveness to the patriarchal values of the group.

A noteworthy example of gender pragmatism is what Carter refers to in the literature that notes the recent development of religious terrorist groups, previously deterred by specific ideology from encouraging female participation, to use violence by women and girls (Ness, 2007). Dearing (2010) notes that the global Salafi-jihadist movement has also influenced many of the most recent female suicide missions by groups in Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya. However, in Afghanistan; (Dearing, 2010) demonstrates that ninety-nine percent of suicide attacks in Afghanistan have been carried out by men. He explains the low propensity for female suicide bombers in Afghanistan as arising from the insurgents’ freedom of mobility and resistance capacity that reduces the need for female suicide bombers, a fiercely conservative culture that restricts female participation in both Afghan society and within insurgent organizations. The group’s mobility and conservatism seem to have a compound negative effect on women’s mobility.

On this current issue of women joining Jihadist groups like IS and in the light of Carter's and Dearing's argument, a number of interviews (see appendix B) has been conducted with Islamic preachers to examine their opinions on how women were recruited differently than men and the role of women in Jihadist groups. Sheikh Rasheed Al Khaznawi, an Islamic reformer from Syria currently based in Norway: “Women are mainly recruited by means of marriage, they either follow their husbands or they get promised marriage when they arrive. I think the role of women in Jihadist groups is very central; they function as recruiters, diffusers of sexual tension by means of temporary marriage, participation in administrating the Jihadist territories by being part of the female police, spies, and suicide bombers.”

Abdul Jaleel Al Saed, a young Muslim Imam and spokesperson says: “women recruitment is limited and is mainly because of alienation or personal relationships. Women's role in Jihadist groups, especially IS in East
Aleppo where I am from, is joining Al Hissba police, home investigation, interrogation and sudden patrol shifts.”

Lama Nahhas, a female Sufi preacher in Syria thinks that women's role is limited to rearing children and marriage, whereas fighting and aggression is restricted to men. While Asma Kiftaro, a prominent female Muslim leader expressed in The Role of Religion conference in Copenhagen December 2014 that women in Jihadist groups “play a very negative role as they are recruiters, suicide bomber, snipers, donators, and mothers raising their children on extremist ideology.”

Cargin and Daly (2009) argue that calculation on women deployment in terrorist groups revolves around three basic factors: propaganda value, effectiveness, and community backlash.

The interviewees’ perception of women’s role is subordinate and/or pragmatic in Jihadists held territories. It is significantly centered around the female body and traditional gender roles put to the service of the group in confinement and mobility. Women restricted to the house are fundraisers and educators of the children. On the other hand, their limited mobility is employed in perpetrating violence towards other women or as a less valuable loss in the front lines.

In support of the interviews output, the CGCC (2012, p. 3) finds that women can be ideologues and supporters of violent extremism. Fink’s (2011) study of terrorism, political violence and governance in Bangladesh finds a worrying trend emerging of Bangladeshi women supporting or encouraging jihad, with women targeted in recruitment drives, as they arouse less suspicion and can engage in community outreach efforts with greater access to families. Von Knop (2007) looks at the multifaceted roles of the women in the movement of Al Qaeda and finds that female involvement is at a formative stage but it is on the rise, with women following a gender-specific interpretation of the radical ideology, the female Jihad, by acting as facilitators, supporters, and educators for the movement. In the peace discourse, women’s community outreach and access to families is equally important as in Fink’s remark, an interesting intersection of strategies between extremist movements and women movements. In the light of this knowledge, and in an attempt to outreach vulnerable recruits PEAD², a Pakistani NGO that utilizes peace education, mirrored this model in their prevention work promoting sustainable peace education and empowering women in alternative narratives.

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² PEAD, a Pakistani organization that uses the method “learn from the enemy”. Available from: [http://www.pead.org.pk](http://www.pead.org.pk)
In his book, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, militancy, and the quest for identity in post New Order Indonesia*, Noorhaidi Hassan (2006) goes on to say: “The fact that Salafi community decisions resort to violence went hand in hand with the radicalization of its discourse casts light on the significance of ideology in a militant Islamist movement: Ideology is not static, but rather dynamic, and develops in line with the contextual changes.” John Esposito argues that religion merely provides the rhetoric- as communism did during the cold war- to disenfranchised groups. Ideology in militant Islamist movements builds on historic intertextualities with contemporary grievances to legitimize the excessive use of violence and create a state of urgency to correct wrongs have long been overdue. This state of urgency creates a lobby of power and the powerful hierarchically suppressing any delays to achieve the goals.

[Agency and Motivations]

To draw a comparative analysis between the White supremacists and Jihadists, I looked into the BBC interview on the News Hour 22.10.2014 where Yasmin Mulbocus, a former member of an Islamist group in London, and Angela King a former member of a white supremacist group in the US, share their reflections on *Why are Some Women Drawn to Extremist groups*. They both stress that similar threads of factors leading to join the group, similar roles within the group, and reasons to disengage. Anger, the need to belong to a larger context, socio-economic and political injustices were among the reasons that drew them to extremism. In the group, they developed a sense of conspiracy, were driven to create change, and revenge from perpetrators or larger society. They both expressed that while in the group they never viewed the group as extremist, viewed own-self as an activist (White supremacist) or representative of god (Islamist). Women in both groups, according to Mulbocus and King viewed children as an extension to the race (white supremacist) or religion (Islamists), part of their responsibilities included performing acts of violence against other women, similarly, the correlation between IS female members and the abducted women\(^3\) is worthy of further research to study how this dynamic might influence the disengagement of female members of IS. These groups gave Mulbocus and King a sense of empowerment, just to realize later they were passing their group's patriarchal agenda.

Both movements adopt a polarized view of the world (Aryan/non-Aryan, Islamic/non-Islamic or Kuffar). Just like the White supremacist movement, (Hoskins, Andrew et al 2009) argue that Jihadist groups are hierarchically organized, with a highly controlled dissemination process that adopts a systematic, centralized, and controlled top-down approach in production and distribution. Both groups pick up an aggressive

\(^3\) *IS Abducted Women*. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eM-oU_zPHG0&feature=sha
patriarchal heteronormative gendered identity and exert efforts to normalize the group values and make it attractive as in the example of White Supremacist Hipsters and ISIS well crafted presentation of the state in a variety of languages that gives a cosmopolitan sense of the Islamic State.

One major difference between the two discourses is that the White Supremacists use a patriot discourse to defend the nation and preserve its borders while Jihadists use a sacred discourse to revive The Caliphate and expand territory. Another departure point is the forms of violent aggressions between the two groups and the centrality of suicide bombing in the Jihadist military technique. Nevertheless, to find such similar concerns at the roots of such diverse movements (White Supremacist and Jihadist). with such different objectives is quite revealing.

Gendered or gender sensitive approaches, Extremism and Conflict?
A balanced statement on equal analysis of the various roles that men and women undertake in conflict, could be transposed to investigating gender in radicalization.

“Our understanding of war and peace would be deepened if conflict analysts were willing to take as a starting point the men and women who make war, and also those who are complicit in it, support it, benefit from it, or suffer from it.”

Another type of statement may romanticize the role of women and lead to not taking their role as perpetrators or former extremists seriously or limiting their interventionist capacity to an assumed “peaceful” agency, this pervasive stereotyping creates gender dichotomies, according to practitioners:

_In war-torn societies...women often keep society going. They...are often the prime advocates of peace. We must ensure that women are enabled to play a full part in peace negotiations, in peace processes, in peace missions._
- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (in Woodhouse et al, 2008)

Gender critiques of conflict resolution theory and practice have sought to move beyond the limited


application of “styles” and “sex difference” and their relation to the effectiveness of conflict management. The critiques are concerned with the male-constructed, generic theories of conflict and conflict resolution which have excluded or downplayed such issues as power imbalances, oppression, social roles and the militarization of international conflict intervention. Conflict resolution theories and de-radicalization practice are largely “gender-neutral”, failing to consider the specific effects of conflict on “women” and “men”.

Stiehm (1995)

One theoretical force for exploring this theme in radicalization has come from the encounter between the feminist theory and conflict/peace research. (Woodhouse et al 2008) debate that the feminist theory is critical of the assumption that the very inclusion of women will eliminate gender inequalities; it is also suspicious of the equation of women with such characteristics as compassion, empathy and co-operation – the assumption of “woman as the peaceful sex”. Rather the discipline is concerned with re-defining concepts of violence, war, security, and peace from feminist perspectives and challenging international conflict management (involving mostly men) which reinforces the exclusionist power structures.

Complex questions emerge as we think about whether women’s engagement as combatants/terrorists and involvement in violent acts should be interpreted as “a sign of women’s newfound empowerment” and simultaneously as “an indication of ongoing gender oppression.” (Ni Aolain, 2013) that should be met in radicalization prevention and disengagement interventions. Ni Aolain (2013) suggests that terrorist organizations have demonstrated remarkable sensitivity to deploying gender-specific appeals to women as a recruitment tactic. They include feminist appeals for equal participation, the offer of redemption to women who have violated the gender norms of their own societies, revenge, nationalism, and religious precept. There is no such documented data whether de-radicalization and prevention interventions are gendered in that men and women play different roles and are assigned different tasks (e.g., men predominantly play the security and police roles, women the civilian roles). Peacekeeping could be the closest discipline to extract indicators from, according to (Woodhouse et al, 2008) of the 17 missions active in 1993, women comprised only 1.7% of military personnel and less than 1% of police. Peacekeeping missions are, therefore, gendered in that men and women play different roles and are assigned different tasks: men predominantly play the military and police roles, women the civilian roles. Becky Carter concludes that there are mixed messages on the desirability of using stereotypes (such as emphasizing women’s maternal role) in counter-terrorism narratives. While typically represented as ‘deviants, monsters or victims’ by the media and academia, some experts find that the women tend to join violent extremist groups for much the same, complex reasons as men.

[Gender and Derad/Prevention practice]

A questionnaire (see appendix C) was sent to practitioners working in prevention, family support and
disengagement, the results came as follows:
Although practitioners show an understanding that men and women may have different needs, they did not
give high value of gendered/gender sensitive approaches on the project design level, as interventions are
mostly individual case tailor made.
Women from different backgrounds (professional, formers, educators, mentors) took part in the intervention
design
The experiences and lessons learned from formers are recognized, utilized and shared with the larger
community, however, there is no special focus or data on the experience of female formers
Practitioners mostly view gender desegregated data as not applicable to their work.
Practitioners face gender specific challenges in their practice; females are considered secondary when
engaged in the movement and victims when disengaged, which often affect their self-value. They also face
issues related to sexuality and gender relations with both genders.
Practitioners listed a number of roles and/or needs their clients often attempt to illicit in them; familial needs,
intimacy (partner, buddy), need to share a righteous cause, need for guidance in how to interact/treat the
opposite gender.
On transference and counter-transference dynamics, practitioners seemed to face the gender specific-
challenges listed above in this context with both genders based on the complexity of the individual
experience of the client.

Disengagement interventions are in general individual tailored, a method despite its numerous advantages,
does not offer an alternative to the sense of belonging to a group. Adopting a gender sensitive approach to
creating alternative narrative mainstreamed in the local communities is key. Recruitment discourses address
everyday grievances and structural discrimination eliciting a false sense of agency; disengagement
interventions should provide gender sensitive alternative channels to address these grievances where the
experiences of women are thoroughly examined and incorporated in the process.
Disengagement and reintegration interventions should encourage problem solving, mobilize creative
solutions from the target group and try to meet this creative input looking at the organic environment of the
recruit from a gender aware posiotion.

Based on the interviews, own practice, questionnaire and literature available on peace operation training, a
gender analysis chart was localized for first line practitioners (see appendix D)

Conclusions:
When it comes down to gender, the way men perceived the role of women and the way women perceived their role is strikingly paradoxical. Men had a normalized patriarchal perception of the female agency, while women viewed their role as an empowered one with vitality and force for change. Cragin and Daly (2009) conclude: “violent extremist group leaders think about their female cadre differently than their male counterparts. The calculation taken by them on how to deploy female members are sometimes strategic and other times opportunistic”.

How extremism is viewed, felt and understood across gender (and culture) should become part of the process for disengagement and prevention studies. The project highlights the lack of data and/or understanding around gender analysis in radicalization prevention and disengagement interventions, a comprehensive research requires extensive efforts and resources. This inadequacy is underlined relative to the sophistication of the gender pragmatism undertaken by radical groups, an imbalance which makes clear an urgency for such research to be conducted.

References:


[Accessed 6th January 2015]

[Accessed 4th January 2015]

[Accessed 4th January 2015]

[Accessed 4th January 2015]

[Accessed: 20th December 2014]


[Accessed 4th January 2015]

Appendix A

Interview Questions with formers:

Name (optional):  Gender:  Age:
Familial status:  Children:  Employment:

1. How old were you when you joined the group?
2. How was your general feeling at that moment?
3. What were your motivations to join the group?
4. What was particularly attractive to you in the group?
5. Did men and women play different roles in the group? What were they? How did you feel about that?
6. Did women have the same access to information as men?
7. What were your values in the group?
8. What were your motivations to disengage/leave the group?
9. How do you define your values today, what changes happened, if any?
10. Any other comments?

Date:  /  /2015
Place: city/country

Appendix B

Interview questions with religious leaders:
1. What is your definition of a Jihadist group?

2. What is the discourse used by Jihadist groups to recruit young foreign fighters? Is the discourse addressing men different from the one addressing women, in what ways?

3. What are your recommendation for an alternative narrative?

4. What do you think is the role of women in Jihadist groups?

5. What role do you think women can play in de-radicalization/prevention?

Appendix C

The Open University of Catalonia
Conflictology Final Project 2015

This questionnaire attempts to understand the role of gender in first line prevention/de-radicalization interventions, in order to analyze “gendered” and “gender sensitive” approaches and their correlation to the efficiency of women interventions, as well as their transference and counter-transference dynamics. By Answering this questionnaire you will help the researcher develop a set of gender tools that would enhance your understanding of the role of this variable in your work and how to best address it. This questionnaire would take approximately **10-15 minutes** to complete. The results will be incorporated in the conflictology Master’s final project report “When Do Women Fail as Peace Makers, Gender Pragmatism” and can be shared with you, if interested.

Please send the completed questionnaire by **Friday the 16th of January** to: ola-saleh@hotmail.com

Should you have any equations, please do not hesitate to contact me!

**Gendered approach:** Your intervention is designed entirely for either men or women

**Gender sensitive approach:** Your intervention is aware of gender roles in different contexts and addresses the needs that arise from that.

Personal information: (kindly note, your personal information will be handled with absolute confidentiality)

- **Name** (optional):
- **Gender**:
- **Organization**:
- **Job title**:
- **contact details** (optional):
- **Country/City**:

**Your target group:**
1. White power movement
2. Jihadists

**Gender of your target group:**
1. Male
2. Female
3. Mixed
1. How would you describe your intervention and what is the objective?
   Gendered approach related
   - Objective:

   Gender sensitive approach related
   - Objective:

   Other, please specify
   - Objective:

2. Are women involved in the design of interventions?
   Yes:
   Professional female experts?

   Female formers?

   Other, please specify

   B. No

3. Does your organization/intervention have male and female practitioners to whom formers of different sexes can safely report?
   Yes
   No

4. Are measures in place to support female formers or female family members (of formers), in particular, to be where they will be safe from re-recruitment?
   Yes, in what way? please explain

   No
5. Is the experience/lessons learned of female formers recognized and utilized by your organization or the larger community?
Yes, in what way?
No
I don’t know

6. In your documentation of cases, do you use gender segregated input for data analysis?
Yes
No
Not applicable

7. What is the estimated percentage of female clients who have shown indicators of change towards the objective of your intervention? (as specified in question number 1)
0%
0%-20%
20%-40%
40%-60%
60%-80%
80%-100%

8. Have you observed any gender specific challenges in work with clients?
Yes, please specify
No

9. Do you observe a pattern of roles and/or needs your clients often attempt to illicit in you?
A. Yes, pattern example:
B. No
C. I don’t know (Thank you, please do not proceed to questions 10-11)

10. The feelings that clients of the same gender as you experiences in relation to you as their coach, could be positive or negative transference based on your clients earlier experiences. If it is applicable, how do you describe the transference from your client:
   A. Positive, please explain
   B. Neutral
   C. Negative, please explain

11. The feelings that clients of the opposite gender as you experiences in relation to you as their coach, could be positive or negative transference based on your clients earlier experiences. If it is applicable, how do you describe the transference from your client:
   A. Positive, please explain
   B. Neutral
   C. Negative, please explain

Appendix D
Project design checklist:
Consider the following points in your project design and interventions:

- Adopt a participatory approach; consult women and men equally and integrate their needs and concerns in all decision-making processes.
- Link grassroots non-violent initiatives led by women into the official de-radicalization interventions led mainly by men.
- Incorporate strategies used men and women to prevent radicalization in the households, communities, and at the state-level in your strategic planning of sustainable interventions.
- Map the activities of external actors (e.g., UN agencies, NGOs, CSOs) based on the presence of gender in their activities, be it gendered, gender sensitive, or gender neutral.
- Consider the way radicalization is affecting men/boys and women/girls, and the roles they play in violent extremist groups?
- Consider the gender-specific threats that might face men/boys and women/girls when disengaging from the violent extremist group of your concern, the results of these threats, and the way men/boys and women/girls are responding to these threats.
- Consider if the gender roles and relations changing in the group or after disengagement, and the way men’s and women’s responsibilities changed.
- Consider the needs of the men and women in disengagement.
- Consider the physical, psychological and social needs and concerns of men and women in the re-integration stage.
- Consider supporting women participation in social, economic and political institutions in the re-integration stage.
- Consider gender desegregated data as source for extracting trends, special features/needs/potentials for your work and target group.
- Consider micro-finance, vocational training, and other capacity building options leading to income generating as a means of empowerment and reconciliation of gender identities in your target group.

Appendix D
Definition of gender, and gender analysis

What is Gender?

‘gender is not synonymous with ‘sex’ or women’ (CHRGJ, 2011, p. 26): gender is ‘relevant to men as well as women, given that gender is as much about men and masculinity as it is about women and femininity’ (Jackson et al, 2011, p. 144-145) It refers to the socially constructed roles, responsibilities, norms, expectations and stereotypes accorded to women and men (e.g., in such areas as division of labour, power-sharing, decision-making). A gender perspective implies analyses of social relations between women and men (girls and boys) in a given context (i.e., a culturally and historically determined context). (Woodhouse et al, 2008).
Sample Gender analysis of the radicalization process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF ANALYSIS</th>
<th>FEATURE</th>
<th>POTENTIAL GENDER IMPACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Increased alienation of boys and/or girls in the community</td>
<td>Search for brotherhood/sisterhood and a somewhere to belong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Increased structural discrimination</td>
<td>Anger against injustices may lead boys and girls to regressive gendered identities against the democratic values of the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Increased exclusion and polarization. National propaganda used to increase support repressive policies against one or more component of the society</td>
<td>Differential impact of structural discrimination and exclusive policies on men/women. Women become active in women-only groups, or are inclined to show more violence to prove worthiness in the newly joined extremist group. Reinforcement of stereotypes of masculinity/femininity (e.g., to be a man is to fight for the cause, to be a woman is to bear the children who will continue the fight)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Overseas extremist groups ready to take in vulnerable recruits</td>
<td>Lack of knowledge and awareness of gender-related issues among recruits may lead them to life threatening situations. (e.g., men proving their manhood by extreme violence, women submitting to constraining gender roles or engaging as active perpetrators as part of what they perceive as their feminist self-actualization. Increased crime and illegal actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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