HARALD WEILNBÖCK

DO WE REALLY NEED “COUNTER NARRATIVES”? AND WHAT WOULD THAT BE ANYWAY? – THE NARRATIVE APPROACH TO AUDIO-VISUAL MEDIA IN DERADICALISATION AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND HATE CRIME

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Introduction

Everybody talks about “counter narratives” these days and about “counter-acting and campaigning in the internet” – in other words, about the need to find ways to use the worldwide web and social media as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube to prevent and avert the increasing threat of violent extremism and terrorism. Rightly so, because clearly, since long the so-called new media have played and still play a significant role in the radicalization and recruitment of young impressionable people for just about every sort of hateful radicalism that is around – most prominently with violent Jihadism and with rightwing-extremism¹.

The emphasis on audio-visual material and new media appears all the more valid since mobile phones and internet also seem to have been quite instrumental for democratic opposition movements and human rights monitoring as for instance with the Tahir Place uprising in Egypt in 2011 (ISD).

In a sense, it is surprising that the internet has not already much earlier been the focus of systematic methodology development, given that the importance of the new media for subcultures in general, and for extremist political and/or religious subcultures in particular, has been evident for quite some time. (ISD) Hence, it might be safe to say that nowadays successful approaches to just about every societal challenge will and should – to a certain degree and in certain ways – employ a new media strategy and develop audio-visual material.

Yet, to exactly what degree and in which ways may one use audio-visual material in deradicalization and hate crime prevent interventions? What kind of audio-visual material would that be in the first place? In other words how would a ‘deradicalizing narrative’ or ‘testimonial’ look like – i.e. how would a media product look like that may rightly be expected to exert a deradicalizing impact and thus effectively facilitate mental processes of working through violent extremism, hate crime, and group-oriented hostility with young radicalized people?

In practical and methodological terms the questions is, how to identify, collect or generate such material – presumably from various sorts of interviewees and/or different kinds of documentary and fictional media contents? In terms of interviewing, how to facilitate a kind of personal and narrative self-expressions that may then be used as an effective tool in the intervention work, be it utterances about personally meaningful experiences in one’s biography – moments of recruiting into or distancing from extremisms and similarly significant others moments –, or be it meaningful instances of personal media consumption (books/novels, films, videos etc.)² that played a role for one’s identity and life conduct?

¹ See INACH, Jugendschutznetz.de, and most recently Der Tagesspiegel 13th April, 2013, p. 34, www.volksempfänger.de.
² Here established methods of “media experience interviewing” may be adopted which have been developed in qualitative culture and media research.
With regard to postproduction, how should one arrange and design these materials as – narrative – media products/ testimonials? And how to design a sophisticated enough pedagogical setting and approach for direct offline intervention work in which such media based narratives may be embedded? How to do this in a way that does not just produce pertinent media content but creates a tool and program that may effectively assist young people in leaving behind life styles of violent extremism and hatred?

In more theoretical terms, is it true and what does it mean that such material should be “narrative”, linguistically and psychologically speaking – rather than argumentative, debating, cognitive/ persuasive, ideological etc., as is often hastily assumed because of the contexts of political and religious extremism? Furthermore, how to assure that all procedures that are employed in producing deradicalizing narratives – the interviewing, selection of appropriate content, all post-production of the gathered materials, embedding into an appropriate offline interventions etc. – correspond with the principles of good-practice deradicalization interventions as they have been discussed in recent studies?3

These are the key questions of the action research project “European Platform of Deradicalizing Narratives” (EDNA)4 which is presently launched as ‘national starter measure’ of methodological development.5

With respect to terminological definition: EDNA’s base criteria for defining its subject matter – violent radicalization/ extremism – are fulfilled by any individual or organization that supports attitudes contrary to the principles of human rights, civil liberties, the constitutional order and the rule of law. Extremist organizations in this sense encourage conduct grounded on ideologies of superiority/ inequality, separation/ exclusion, and on the legitimacy of group- focused hostility, resentment, hatred and violence. Typically, such organizations aggressively recruit young people, draw them into a condition of dependence and establish an unyielding in-group out-group divide. Key impact factors of such recruitment usually are of a mostly emotional and relational nature which generally goes back to biographical issues of psycho-social deprivation in the family, violent abuse, or denigration, thus causing a desire of belonging and identity and impulses of acting-out in violence.

EDNA’s main objective – to generate ‘deradicalizing narratives/ media testimonials’ (and

3 The narrative principle.
4 The EDNA project is conducted by the Berlin-based Violence Prevention Network (VPN) which also builds up the “European Network of Deradicalization” (ENoD/ EU) establishing profiles of good-practice approaches in hate crime prevent and deradicalization interventions throughout Europe. EDNA is conducted in cooperation with Minor-Projektkontor e.V. and in close liaison with the project “Women/Girls/Gender in Extremism” (WomEx/EU) conducted by Cultures Interactive e.V. (Berlin) focusing on approaches to and narratives of women and girls that are engaged in or associated with violent extremism. These projects are financed by the EC, DG Home Affairs, and are closely collaborating with this DG’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN).
5 In its intended second project phase the EDNA approach will be brought onto a European level. Here various collaborations with colleagues from other member states and other contexts of violent extremism and media work may be established which aim at facilitating national initiatives of creating suitable “deradicalising narratives” and intervention approaches in these countries.
build a suitable offline intervention setting around them) – pertains to an undertaking that is generally referred to as “counter-narrative” approach. Therefore, it needs to be stated explicitly at the outset what will be elaborated in more detail further down: The term “counter-narratives” is a most unfortunate misnomer which is indicative of grave misconceptions about how deradicalization works and how personal processes of working-through extremism and hatred can be facilitated – also about what can and cannot be done in deradicalization via internet and social media. Hence, the most widespread term “counter narratives” will eventually have to be replaced by a more appropriate term.

Moreover, at the outset it seems prudent to call to memory just how challenging the task is to reach out to and effectively work with violently radicalized young people and hate crime offenders – be it via audio-visual web-based tools or via any off-line, face-to-face intervention approach. In all experience, radicalized young people are quite difficult to engage with through any medium and approach – and by any sort of interventionists or educator, especially if they are statutory employees and government staff. This is because here one has to reach out to, win confidence/trust and have formative impact on a type of young person that, due to her/his biographical experiences, has become highly distrustful, resistant, idiosyncratic, and possibly also aggressive and cynical towards any adult mainstream society initiatives, be it as on-line media user or as off-line face-to-face interlocutor – distrustful sometimes to a degree that borders a paranoid frame of mind and interaction.

On the other hand, however, every experienced practitioner will reconfirm that these at-risk young people, in spite of some of their actions and attitudes, may also be quite likeable as persons and often are positively inspired in many respects, once one manages to create a conducive setting for interacting and working with them! Not to speak of the fact that the young people often are quite capable of expressing a set of personal, social, and (geo-)political grievances/issues that cannot easily be answered by any social work practitioner or intervention approach and that might be worthwhile for mainstream society to listen to and engage with more closely.

The challenge of creating impactful materials and a media-based approach looms ever larger if one considers how highly pessimistic many experienced first-line practitioners have gotten who worked with radicalized young people and tried to use audio-visual input, “narratives”, or “testimonials” about extremism, recruitment, terrorism and its victims. The most well-intended approaches have quite frequently failed entirely – or even backfired and eventually aggravated the situation. All too often we seem to have created interviews, testimonials and other media productions that we – middle-class, middle-age, mainstream citizens and activists of prevent and human rights work etc. – find appealing and that we would like our children and young people to consume and appreciate. And already our children, while not being the target group, may then have tended to smirk at rather than be profoundly moved by these testimonial on any ethical or moral level.
To be honest, quite a view of these media products would have to be called self-centered, maybe even selfish which is important to note since self-centeredness in its ultimate consequence is a key feature of any extremist state of mind. It will thus support polarization rather than have deradicalizing effect. For this very reason first-line practitioners describe their task of working with young radicalized individuals as being nothing other but engaging with an extreme state of self-centeredness. In some cases this preoccupation with oneself – and some key identity issues – may be so severe that almost any concept of the other and of the self-in-relation-to-the-other has been lost. This sense of the self and other needs to be re-built and “re-socialized” as a somewhat older term had put it quite rightly.

Hence, such relational work of deradicalization would have to avoid any form of self-centeredness on the part of the facilitators, and requires maximal caution even with any impetus of ethical insistence, let alone with bringing in videos with a strong moral or human touch impetus. Quite on the contrary, practitioners tend to conclude that facilitating change with young people in a state of extreme self-preoccupation requires an approach that is able to be most selfless – i.e. dialogic, open-process, non-directional, dynamic agenda etc. In a word, maximal attention is devoted to the other/ the client who is addressed in the most unconditional and open-minded manner possible, in order to make contact – and create relationship between the preoccupied self and a significant other. This is true for any kind of good practice deradicalization intervention, be it off- or online. But it is certainly most difficult for an online approach, since one may hardly create a testimonial or other kinds of videos – unless one focuses on one’s own product, thus on oneself and on one’s concept of it.

For these reasons, some of the most qualified firstline deradicalization and hate crime prevent practitioners – on the basis of their quite sobering experiences with media approaches – meanwhile tend to hold that “one cannot deradicalize on-line, period!” and that “any audio-visual material is quite risky to use in intervention contexts”. Even worse, in view of the present boom of – belated – attention for internet and social media strategies, some practitioners have acquired the view “that these media people and academicians just don’t know the first thing about how deradicalization works (!)” . While this may not be a very supportive nor at all professional attitude, it is possibly quite indicative of where we stand in approaching the challenging task of dealing with media and the internet in terms of deradicalization and hate crime offender rehabilitation.

What makes matters even more difficult is the fact that media project workers and internet activists seem to not liaise much with deradicalization practitioners that work on the ground in the offline – so that their experiences and expertise is not called upon very often. Consequently, many of the media/internet initiatives – and pertaining academic fields – seem to be populated by (media) specialists that do not have much knowledge about methodological key issues of firstline deradicalization interventions. Moreover, quite understandably, these colleagues are unlikely to easily recognize the fact that most of a deradicalization intervention needs to be offline for intrinsic reasons – and that any audio-visual material needs to be carefully designed to accommodate the offline
intervention that it may be employed in.

Hence, considerable thought and experimentation must be invested in developing appropriate methods and procedures for (i) researching and approaching possible interviewees (and/or selecting existing materials, documentary and fictional narratives), (ii) conducting the interviews, (iii) procuring the post-production of the audio-visual material, and (iv) creating a suitable off-line intervention approach in which the audio-visual materials may then be embedded. For, despite the high attention presently devoted to internet issues, the methodology of a deradicalizing narratives approach which is sophisticated and sustainable enough to work well with our most challenging targeted group of young people is still in its very early stages.

The EDNA context – current misconceptions and fallacies around so-called “counter narratives” and testimonials

The EDNA project of action research and tool development is designed to fill the gaps and answer the open questions about deradicalizing narratives/testimonials – which, as stated above, are widely referred to as so-called “counter narratives” and often confused with “counter-messaging” tools. EDNA thus intends to help avoid some of the fallacies and misconceptions that inevitably arise whenever a new field of research and activity is inaugurated – and whenever the advisable interagency collaborations have not yet been fully put into place, which in this case regards the rapport between media professionals and offline practitioners of deradicalization interventions that work in various at-risk areas of society.

One of the most current misconceptions which has characterized the early days of internet and social media strategies seems pretty much overcome at this point in time. Today it almost goes without saying that, while the spotting and banning of websites that present hostile, dehumanizing, and violently extremist content still has to be considered necessary, any such restrictive measures must not be mistaken as the main or even only a very important part of a comprehensive prevent and deradicalization strategy. For in all experience it is impossible to eradicate such material. Moreover, the very idea of eradicating any form of personal expression – even the most shocking and detestable ones – is quite dubious to begin with. Rather, it is much more commonly acknowledged today that such material needs to be taken note of as a part of social reality and be worked with in appropriate intervention settings – some say needs to be “countered” – so that sustainable civic resilience may spring from it.

However, other more intricate sorts of misunderstandings still linger. Most wide-spread at this point seems a certain kind of optimism, maybe even naïvite about what it actually takes to create deradicalizing media material and/or testimonials – or to put it more precisely: what it takes to create audio-visual materials that, within a methodical intervention approach, may successfully assist individuals from various high-risk target groups in leaving life styles of hatred, extremism, and violence.

More often than not a rather carefree attitude prevails that regards it as more or less self-
evident how a deradicalizing narrative/testimonials would have to look like. It often seems to be assumed that basically any audio-visual (interview) material about issues of extremism will do, as long as it stems from a “credible source” (of one of the major stakeholder groups, as former extremists, victims, family, social work practitioners etc.) and is an “authentic” and “emotional” self-expression of the person – and as long as one knows the right places for it to be stuck into the world wide net and social media. This of course leaves open, among other things, the question of how to measure and implement credibility, authenticity and emotion. Clearly, the above mentioned observation of practitioners who work directly with radicalized and/or high-risk young people in the offline domain and who claim that the most well-intended testimonial might fail entirely or even backfire and aggravate the situation, has not communicated yet to those that are engaged in media production.

Another misperception which often accompanies the above and is quite frequent among professionals who work in online counter-extremism activities, is of a methodological – and epistemological – sort: It is often stated that what needs to be done first and foremost is to closely analyse how extremists’ internet sites work and how online radicalization and social media recruitment operate. The implication here generally is that such insights would then without further ado teach us how to do deradicalisation and allow us to produce so-called “counter-narratives” as tools to be employed in the internet.

For sure, it is certainly not unimportant to know what goes on in extremists’ social media and website formats, especially if one wants to create audio-visual material oneself targeted to help at-risk young people to avoid recruitment – or even to revert a process of violent radicalization. Also, those who set out to engage in “counter-messaging” or “counter-arguing” activities of course need to know what extremists websites’ messages are in order to be able to refer to it. False statements, wrong arguments and forged evidence that are put onto the internet by extremists as means of propaganda need to be exposed, rectified and refuted. In all these respects it is not at all inappropriate to poses the question: “How do extremists websites look like”.

But such analysis will not tell us anything about how to deradicalize; and the “countering” and rectifying will not produce “deradicalizing narratives”. It will just clarify what is right and wrong, as any counter-campaigning will just gather and present persuasive material in favor of diversity, democracy and human rights. Above all, such activities will only be able to address and mobilize liberal civil society where deradicalization is not an issue (at least not in any immediate respects) and thus may strengthen societal resilience at best. Moreover, all this is based on the hope that most people have enough reason and sobriety to acknowledge a convincing argument (and not just go on denying the Holocaust for instance). In contrast, producing “deradicalizing narratives” and developing a narrative intervention approach that effectively deradicalizes – on- and off-line – is a different task altogether.

Learning from extremists? – the pitfalls of so-called counter-radicalisation through media
Hence, the assumption that the analysis of extremists’ websites would in any way enable us to develop tools and approaches of deradicalization, is quite misleading indeed. In addition, when looking at these assumptions more closely one realizes that they often imply that not only should we analyse extremists’ websites but we should learn from them, become able to reproduce what they do and then use this knowledge to counter-campaign against them. Here the base idea seems to be that deradicalizing media products need to be structured in exactly the same way as the extremists’ products themselves, just the other way around, supporting the contrary attitudes – as it were the good-guys-convictions (of democracy, pluralism, diversity etc.). In other words, it is implied that we should copy the radicals in terms of method but then “counter-radicalize” the audience, as it were radicalize them in the opposite direction.

Tragically, any such “counter-radicalizing” approach would reconfirm what extremists have held all along about any prevention and deradicalization interventions: that “they just brainwash you”, “turn you around”, “manipulate you”, “are selfish/ self-righteous” and “take power over you”, work for “the system” and for the “enemy of truth” that “only we are the bearers of” etc.

Certainly, not very many colleagues are likely to follow through with this logic and fully subscribe to it after thinking about its implications a bit more. Yet, the quite dubious term “counter-radicalization”, also “counter-campaigning” is very widespread and generally taken as self-evident. Probably the only group of professionals that is immune to hastily buy into any such counter-radicalization logic is – once again – offline practitioners who work directly with the young people in face-to-face settings. Because they know full well that not much is gained if one manages to “turn around” a young person in this way. What is more, from their direct experience these practitioners are acutely aware of one key principle of their challenging work: that one must never do what radicalizers do – or even follow the erroneous impetus to compete with radicalizers on their own grounds, among them being “brainwashing” and “selfish ... manipulation”.

Even aside from this base principle it is quite apparent that any such “counter-radicalizing” agenda would not comply with the methodological good-practice guidelines – of open- process, non-directive, narrative etc. work – and would certainly not be selfless and dialogic in the above defined sense. Hence, focusing our attention primarily on trying to analyze – and possibly even copy and learn from – extremist on-line contents puts us at risk of getting into a methodological deadlock.

The no-countering principle of good-practice deradicalisation interventions

The counter-radicalization fallacy leads us to a closely related and even more widespread misconception about what can and cannot be done in on-line interventions – and how deradicalization processes work to begin with. Many strategy papers and projects that are concerned with on-line approaches start from the key assumption that what is needed to be done most urgently in the face of extremist internet material, is: to “counter” it (!), i.e.
to level “counter-arguments”, create “counter-narratives”, produce “counter”-testimonials and/or engage in systematic “counter-messaging” against what is put out by extremists’ websites and social media.

In other words, the underlying assumption is that the force of extremist recruitment via internet is derived mostly from “messages”, “arguments”, and (fabricated) evidence – and countering is the way to deal with it. Consequently, this would require a primarily content-oriented and rational approach which disagrees, challenges, contests, and contradicts these “messages” on a factual, intellectual, ideological, and rational level. Whenever the term “narratives” is brought up in these contexts, it is mostly used in a vague metaphoric manner, meaning “contestation”, “argument”, “back-up story”, “representation”, and “depiction” (with the specific exception of the victim testimonial projects; see beneath). This rather loose terminological usage is diametrically different from what the linguistic – and colloquial – term “narrative” really means, which is: recount personally lived-through experiences and events.

Moreover this base strategy line of “countering” is generally expressed in a quite combative and belligerent tone: To quote just one example, the United Nation’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UN-CTITF) states on this issue with unyielding rigor that we need to “combat” extremism and to this end should produce “counter-narratives” and that these “counter-narratives” need to be able to put forth “an effective comprehensive message that dismantles and counter-argues against every dimension of the extremist narrative”.

Now, from a methodological point of view one just needs to ask: What impact will it most likely have on an extremist if one attempts to “counter”, “argue”, “challenge”, “dismantles”, “combat” her/his arguments and contestations? First-line practitioners of deradicalization – in fact anyone who has ever really interacted or worked with young people that find themselves in a radicalized state of mind and/or have been recruited into an extremist infrastructure – would answer without hesitation: “Countering” and “arguing” will not deradicalize any of these young people. On the contrary, it will further provoke and harden them in their attitude and behaviors – and thus unintentionally support their radicalism. The more radicalized a person is, the more likely it is that s/he will be further radicalized by being “countered”. In fact, radicalized people and violent extremists feed on being “countered” and challenged, they crave to be contested and fought against so that they can all the more rightfully assume the gesture of the unjustly persecuted truth-bearers who are discriminated against by the whole world – and the “system” – which wants to take away and dismantle their truth. This is why professional recruiters actively look for situations in which they are countered. Most vulnerable and awkward they feel when they are not contested – and when they get into a situation in which a truly narrative exchange is promoted.

Therefore, the very first lesson that any social worker and frontline deradicalization practitioner throughout Europe has unfailingly learned – or else s/he has failed in her/his work – is: You must not argue with a radicalized person. You must not counter! You
must not talk ideology to an extremist! The practitioner exchange and action research workshops conducted by the RAN Working Group on Deradicalisation (and by the ENoD project) has come to a quite unanimous conclusion on this point: There is a no-countering principle that applies to do good-practice deradicalisation interventions, because any approach that puts a premium on “countering”, “counter-arguing”, and/or “dismantling” the extremists’ contestations and beliefs will fail and even backfire – be it off- or on-line.  

To be sure, as already indicated above, false statements and fabricated evidence must be contested and exposed. What is wrong and forged, needs to be corrected. Civic education, out-reach initiatives, community organizing, resilience building, empowerment and similar educational and preventive activities may be employed in sophisticated manners to accomplish this task. However, on-line activities aiming to have deradicalizing impact are an entirely different subject matter. They call for an altogether different approach which has not yet been sufficiently defined in detail – but should certainly follow the principles of good-practice deradicalization as they have been established for offline interventions.

To formulate this in terms of the different RAN working groups that are concerned with deradicalization and prevention: The RAN working group on Internet and Social Media rightly stresses that “the term ‘counter-narrative’ has come to be used in relation to a very wide range of activities” and that it is necessary to distinguish “between these different activities, because they require different approaches in terms of messages, messengers, tactics, partnerships ...”. The authors therefore succinctly suggest to delineate a “spectrum” – which, however, they call a “counter-narrative spectrum”, thus stressing the countering element very much. This spectrum consists of three strategies: (1) “alternative narratives”, which “put forward a positive story about social values such as tolerance, openness, freedom, democracy”, then (2) “government strategic communications” about “what government is doing, refu[ing] misinformation, and seek[ing] to forge relationships with key constituencies and audiences” and finally (3) “counter-narratives ... that directly or indirectly challenge extremist narratives either through ideology, logic, fact or humour.”

Now, the RAN working group on Deradicalization and Exit Interventions as well as the RAN group on Prevention would certainly agree with the first two points. However, RAN Derad, coming from its workshops of knowledge exchange among first-line practitioners of face-to-face deradicalization interventions throughout Europe, would disagree with point 3 – and with the concept of a continuous “spectrum” of countering by means of “counter-narratives”. For, none of the three activities leave room for a sort of intervention that could operate along the lines of the no-countering principle which has proven to be of key importance for deradicalization.

Therefore, firstly, RAN Derad would suggest to dedicate the point 3 merely to the task of correcting misinformation, challenging statements, and counter-arguing flawed arguments

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6 This is not to say that there is no place for any element of confrontation, ideological issues and arguments in good-practice intervention altogether; see Guidelines paper point.
and to not use the term “counter-narratives” anymore in this context. Secondly it would suggest formulating a point 4 – or a second spectrum of activity altogether. This second spectrum would be reserved for deradicalization interventions proper. However, since this new and separate range of activities would need to be able to facilitate processes which are entirely different from educating, informing, and campaigning, it needs to be set apart clearly in methodological terms. Most importantly it would have to leave aside any “countering” strategies and decidedly go beyond operating with “ideology, logic, fact”.

The RAN internet group seems to partly anticipate this conceptual shift when it explicitly states that “emotions are more important than evidence” and that an “appeal to human emotions” is needed – while it, however, leaves unanswered exactly how the emotional appeal would come in with an intervention strategy that goes through information, “ideology, logic, fact”. Furthermore, there is a clear awareness about the limits of argumentation and persuasion: “Evidence may not achieve [much]” since it “can always be refuted and countered” – which indeed should make us think twice about “countering” altogether.

By the same token the RAN internet group concedes that “counter-narratives are not about winning the argument or winning over the target audience”. Rather, the so-called “counter-narratives” should aim at a “gradual movement in the right direction” by which a movement of personal growth and development seems to be implied and not merely a change of opinions. Yet, it remains unclear how such “gradual movement” of personal change could be conceptualized and how “the right direction” would be defined and assessed – other than again following an argumentative, cognitive, and ideological approach. Hence, even this or gradual approach to countering would not be able to observe the no-countering principle – and profit from its great potentials to facilitate sustainable deradicalization processes.

Even more unclear is the question of how and with which methods such personal movement may be facilitated. Plus, should these more “gradual” “counter-narratives” envision a more subtle and careful mode of arguing, this might very easily come down to being just a more crafty, sneaky, and manipulative sort of argumentation – and thus be perceived as brainwashing. In case the “gradual movement” intervention should aim at bringing in some additional “appeal to human emotions”, this would then incur risks of sensationalism and of employing an undue human touch style that might easily alienate the target group – and is questionable in pedagogical respect.

Hence, in order to get to the point that online approaches, too, become able to observe – and in fact profit from – the good-practice principle of no-countering, we need to define an entirely different approach. This approach would avoid the above mentioned pitfalls of fact-oriented/ideological/intellectual etc. strategies and would thus not be doomed to fail our most important target group. Moreover, this approach would be totally dissimilar from any strategies of countering/arguing and from working on the level of “ideology, logic, fact”.
This, of course, is not at all an easy task. Since the no-countering principle does apply in the strict sense here. It not only means to not focus on countering the radicalizers’ key contestations but also requires avoiding the use of arguments in general when practicing deradicalization and hate crime prevent interventions – and thus steer free from intellectual, evidence oriented and debate-like modes of interaction altogether, at least for the most part. (These may come in only from time to time, as an aside, and without any insistence as to implicitly desired mind changes – and they would come in mostly in the later phases of the process).

In fact, for prevent practitioners who come from traditions of civic education and democracy pedagogy and who have worked primarily in educational settings – or else in activism and campaigning –, this usually comes as quite a challenge. Plus, in many member states deradicalization is a new topic which is in the process of being developed. These prevent practitioners and activist are the main source of personnel for staffing deradicalization programs. For them the no-countering principle may seem almost paradoxical – or at least impracticable. They often feel: “What else could we possibly be doing if we may not be activists and educators anymore – and if we may not bring up arguments, support them by evidence, expose fabrication, correct errors, in a word employ ‘ideology, logic, fact’? ... What is left, as approach, if we refrain from differentiating right from wrong and true from false?” Activists in internet and media production might feel this way even stronger because the tradition of education and enlightenment is deeply ingrained in prevent media work. Also, generally being beyond any direct an unmediated contact with the target group, might make it more difficult for media activists to envisage what an alternative method could be.

**What is the opposite of countering? – Why would deradicalization need to be narrative? And what is a narrative anyway?**

Now, where could we expect to get answers and assistance if we feel that the task of going beyond countering and arguments – and of doing without ideology, logic, fact – leaves us greatly helpless? A most useful source of methodological assistance lies in the empirical good-practice research that has recently been undertaken with various successful (offline) promising of deradicalization interventions throughout Europe. (This also seems much more appropriate than focusing primarily on the analysis of extremists’ internet and media campaigns, as was stated above.) After all, empirical good-practice research was the field which had thankfully alerted us that countering and levelling argumentations is largely ineffective and potentially detrimental.

Hence, one way of answering the question of what the alternative to countering/ arguing is – and how effective internet interventions may thus proceed – is to remind us of the results of this good-practice research. By way of a short abstract: Successful approaches to deradicalization have been found to be open-process, relational, and exploratory interventions that work in non-directional and non-argumentative ways, are based on trust, confidentiality, voluntary involvement and commitment and may thus also engage in posing personal challenges. Moreover, these good-practice approaches focus on the
development of personal story-telling and emotional intelligence. They unfold best within group settings and generally touch upon biographical, familial, gender-related and power issues/ experiences and combine both accepting and confrontational modes of interaction. On occasion they include youth cultural and peer education methods, touch upon political and religious issues, sometimes also work with fictional media narratives and bring in representatives of family, community and civil society as far as possible. Such interventions are delivered by skilled, specially-trained non-governmental practitioners who have license to act independently within and across statutory institutions and are proactively assisted in their interventions by the institutional staff. Finally, these good-practice approaches are accompanied by state-of-the-art quality control.

Consequently, any internet and media approach that recognized the need to avoid countering and go beyond delivering arguments could focus on these research results, almost as a methodological checklist, and attempt to fulfil the requirements in their development of online intervention concepts.

For sure, there also is a very short and simple way of conveying what is stated by this most exhaustive, yet quite dense description of good-practice methodology principles. Put in one phrase, good practice deradicalization interventions are narrative – and follow the principles of narrative interaction! Narrativity, here, is understood in the strictly non-metaphorical sense and refers to a consensual shorthand definition drawn from social sciences, linguistics and interdisciplinary narratology – including psychology (Routledge Handbook/ Mc Loyd). A narrative is thus understood to mean that a narrator/ protagonist recounts first-hand experiences and actions that s/he has personally lived-through and/or committed. Such narrative accounts usually relate occurrences and (inter-)actions whereby the narrator/ protagonist portrays other characters and their actions, depicts contexts and refers to a perceived challenge, fate or conflict. S/he will then tell how this led up to a certain initiative designed to solve the conflict or handle the challenge or fate, express certain modes of feeling about the outcome and anticipate future action.

Moreover, a narrative in this strict sense always implies co-narrativity, i.e. it is conceived of as a communicative and co-facilitated process. Engaging a co-narrative process means that the narrative unfolds and is further developed in an – interactive and/or mental – dialogue between a narrator and her/his listeners/ audiences (possibly also imagined audiences). Such co-narrative process/ dialogue is dynamic and open-ended in principle. It may thus be further propelled and developed by questions from engaged listeners and audiences – especially by what has been coined narrative follow-up questions, implying a certain mode of interaction.

While narrative questioning as a technique, and as attitude, is not entirely self-evident – and might not emerge naturally in usual conversations at least within Western culture – it can be acquired as skill quite easily. To give but one hint here, narrative follow-up questions generally are how-questions. They ask how events/ actions evolved and how they were experienced personally, step by step; or else they aim at expanding the narrative corpus and, for instance, ask which similar events/ experiences the narrator
could possibly remember and relate. In turn, co-narrative interaction hardly ever uses why-questions or factual detail questions (which are much used in journalistic interviews and in natural conversations). Because why-questions and factual detail questions tend to lead up to discussing and debating opinions or hypotheses about causes and effects. And such discussions and conversations lie on a more abstract level of logical reasoning and tend to fall out of touch with the person’s immediate experience of lived-through events and actions.\(^7\)

In summary, narratives/ co-narratives are dialogic processes that aim to explore and express personally lived-through experiences of occurrences and actions. They attempt to fathom these experiences in the greatest possible depth – and depict subjectively colored scenes and environments. It thus turns out: These dialogic narratives are exactly what we were looking for at the outset when we were asking what the opposite of “countering” might be – and what would thus lend itself to good practice deradicalization (while we learned that countering is not working at all). In fact, it is narratives that are the very opposite of “countering” and arguing! For argumentative statements, discussions and rectifications do not engage in exploring subjective experience very much, if at all. To be sure, with any individual which is involved in a debate or discussion there will almost always be some personal experiences in background of his or her argumentations; and these experiences will function as motivational basis and trigger which prompts him/her to defend the particular argument. Yet, this little but crucial piece of personal experience most often remains largely unexplored – even unconscious – in the debate/discussion. Moreover, argumentative forms of exchange rightly claim a general validity – beyond any individual experiences – and therefore operate by rationality, logic, evidence and persuasion rather than by narrations of individual perceptions. It might therefore not be easy to facilitate a mix that combines arguments and logic on the one hand and narrative renditions of subjective experiences on the other. There is yet another proof of how much narratives are indeed the opposite of argumentations, linguistically and psychologically – and how much we thus need narratives and narrativity/ co-narrative processes in order to facilitate impactful deradicalisation processes: This is the quite simple fact that one cannot argue with a narrative. Any first-hand account of a lived-through personal experience cannot – and ought not – be countered or challenged. For nobody may rightly claim that what another person expresses as her/his personal experience is wrong, incorrect, invalid etc. To argue in such ways would doubtlessly be highly inappropriate and disrespectful, even abusive. Most of all, however, it would be totally nonsensical to argue with a narrative because personal narratives are always valid per se. One may feel sorry, frightened or delighted upon hearing about some occurrences or about how somebody has experienced certain events. Or one may have questions as to how exactly the experience/ occurrence did unfold and what then came of it. But the personal narratives as such cannot be countered nor argued against. It is for this very reason that one RAN Derad member emphatically

\(^7\) Since narrative questioning is generally not practiced much in natural conversations, training workshops are available in fields of qualitative social research, especially with biography studies that convey the skill of biographical-narrative interviewing.
stated in a discussion about so-called counter-narrative approaches: “There cannot be counter-narratives really! Because firstly, we are the narrative! And secondly there is no countering in the narrative domain to begin with!” – One may, however, engage in a co-narrative interaction with this narrative by way of narrative follow-up questions or by adding own experiences to it.

Of course, one thing may always happen whenever one encounters a narrative: One may disbelieve the sincerity and honesty of the narrator and thus doubt the authenticity of the presented story. In other words, certain given stories may raise questions of being partly or fully invented and contrived for particular strategic reasons (propaganda, manipulation, recruitment etc.), aiming to trigger certain reactions with the listeners/audiences – and therefore not being proper narratives in the above defined sense.

Moreover, even beyond fabrications and inauthentic propaganda stories, one narratological truism needs to be noted here: Anyone’s narrative about a personally lived-through event may – and most likely will – involuntarily embellish or smooth over what had in fact been her/his original experience at the time of the actual events. S/he might thus miss to render important aspects of her/his experience in that very moment. Such wilful or involuntary narrative arrangements – and any other kind of ‘mental postproduction’ – are considered to be a quite natural feature of human memory and story-telling. It attests to the constitutive vagueness of narratives, reflecting the fundamental openness and indeterminacy of human life as such. In more political terms, the openness/indeterminacy of narratives may also be called semantic plurality and be perceived as diversity of subjective meaning(s) – and thus directly pertains to issues of (de-)radicalization. For all violent extremisms repudiate plurality and diversity – socially and psychologically – as they also repudiate any indeterminacy, relativity and ambivalence. In turn, distancing oneself from extremism basically means to learn how to acknowledge diversity and ambivalence – and thus become more pro-social and also psychologically more stable.

The constitutive vagueness and diversity of human narration has to do with the fact that every narrative about past experiences is given before the backdrop of the narrator’s present situation and will unfailingly pay heed to her/his present needs in terms of identity and coping strategies. In other words, not everybody is right away able or willing to engage in the most conscientious soul-searching and give a most candid and unabashed rendition of past personal experiences. In particular this is the case if the narrated experiences are fraught with conflict or carry high identity investments, as is the case with radicalization – or if they refer to experiences that had a psycho-traumatic impact on the person.

It is because of this very vagueness/diversity that social sciences’ and psychology’s concepts of narration have come to differentiate between the concepts of “experienced life-history” and “narrated life-story” as a key distinction within which human storytelling unfolds. Made operational in a methodical way these two interactive poles may fuel a dynamic process of therapeutic negotiation in mental and conversational respect –
which of course may well include issues like working through hatred and radicalization. Similarly a terminological difference is drawn between “factual accuracy of a narrative” and its “narrative truth(s)”, the latter of which focusing on the emblematic and symbolic significance that a narrative might posses, vis-à-vis its matter-for-fact correctness (Rosenthal, Köttig, also Mc Leod, HW, David Herman).

To be sure, what has just been called the constitutive vagueness and semantic plurality within human narration does not at all reduce the key importance which narrativity and narrative methods have for good practice deradicalisation – and, in fact, for any approach aimed at facilitating personal change and development. On the contrary! For this is where the dynamic element of the above defined co-narrative process comes in as a particular asset and methodological tool: Any personal narrative can – and in fact needs to – be developed and enhanced through an interactive process of co-narrative exchange with and of narrative questioning by another person, i.e. by active listeners or audiences. This co-narrativity may well be put in terms of what well-known psychologist and narratologist Roy Schafer once said about psychotherapy, i.e. that “psychotherapy is nothing else but the telling of the same story all over again, except that after some time you tell the story much better than before”. In other words, the dialogic development and enhancement of the narrative is key. A narrative in this sense is no static text or monolog that is put out by means of a technical medium. Rather it is a facilitated process which is shared between a narrator and her/his audience.

Hence, be it because of propagandistic, manipulative, and deceitful intentions or as result of personal coping and identity needs, any given narrative that is considered inauthentic or else seems less than frank or exhaustive, may at any time be further developed by a co-narrative interaction process. This developmental dynamic will render the narrative “better” in Roy Schafer’s terms so that it becomes more in-depth, articulate and personally meaningful – while it freely explores and negotiates the constitutive semantic plurality that any personal narrative possesses. These processes will then ever more effectively fulfill the key function of human narration: express, mentally work-through, and cope with lived-through experience – which always also means facilitate personal change and development. Clearly, any such co- narrative dynamic of personal change would be inherently deradicalising and pro-social in its effects. For this kind of process sets out to engage with the ambivalence of narrative truth(s) and the plurality/ diversity of semantic meaning(s) – which effectively precludes extremism. Since wherever is ambivalence and semantic diversity there cannot be any extremism.

It thus is a true asset that one cannot counter nor argue with a personal narrative. Arguments and narrations are entirely different modes of communication indeed. One can only engage with the narrative and help to further develop it in a shared relational process. This key feature of human story telling really stems from the fact that narratives can do what arguments cannot: Narratives are able to deradicalize, i.e. to trigger extensive and profound processes of personal change. In all experience, arguments are not able to bring about such effects – but can only be a minor element at best in this business.
Recognizing the key importance of narrativity and its underlying no-countering principle takes on an almost tragic note if one considers how focused and dependent democracy and western culture seems to be on leveling arguments, mounting evidence, debating and countering adversaries’ arguments. Bearing in mind how polarizing and in fact radicalizing any debate may easily turn out – especially if increasingly large sections of society feel alienated and do not partake in the common cultural discourse anymore – it seems that our democratic debate culture would need to more employ narrative forms of interaction – already as a tool of self-protection. Becoming more narrative – and relational – in education and psychosocial interventions might then also mean to safeguard freedom and democracy. For sure, it would be most unfortunate – even fateful – if we were not able to recognize this prerequisite of good societal self-protection just because we hesitate to suspend our most cherished habits of debating and countering. Because then we would tragically overlook that we fuel violent extremism while we still think we pursue the quest for the most convincing and productive argument.

Is there such thing as an “extremist narrative” at all?

One further observation about our concept of narrative – and of co-narrative exchange – is worth mentioning here. Because it underlines how important it is to be rather precise about what narrativity really means – and not be confused by the widespread metaphoric use of the terms “narrative” (meaning “rendition”, “story”, “contestation”, “argument” in a rather vague sense). On the basis of our evidence-based definition one thing becomes quite clear: What we generally refer to as “radicalizing media narratives” (propaganda videos, recruitment materials etc.) and what then some want to put “counter-narratives” against: these so-called “extremist narratives” are not really narrative at all! On the contrary. Hardly anything is so dissimilar from sharing first-hand, personally lived-through experiences than an extremist video and/or propaganda production. Nothing could be further from engaging in a dialogic and co-narrative process which exchanges follow-up questions and answers and delves into an individual’s biographical memory in a maximally truthful and detailed manner.

In fact, extremists’ communications use quite closed and prearranged outlines of media interaction. These are sometimes charged with a certain emotional appeal or even contain isolated elements of personal experience, or simulations of it. Quite frequently these outlines also present what might look like a story/narrative in any more loose or metaphoric sense of the term. Rudimentary story patterns may refer to symbolic events – or present a specific tale of history as such. Usually this comes down to a pattern like: “We carry the truth and the rest of the world has always been against us so that we have to fight for survival and bring the truth to the world ...” etc. – which really is more of an argumentative conclusion than anything else.

And yet, extremists’ communications and media outlines seem to not really be argumentative either in the strict sense of the word. They usually do not present a very coherent or sufficiently stringent chain of reasons and conclusions, sometimes seem strangely incomplete, willful or fragmentized, and more often than not are struck with
quite obvious inconsistencies. Rather, these outlines in linguistic terms seem to represent a fairly idiosyncratic hybrid of various different genres of communication – a linguistic hybrid that is most effective with one particular audience only: the violent extremists or at-risk audiences of the particular extremist creed they have been produced for.

Be this as it may, one thing becomes sufficiently clear when drawing from evidence-based and interdisciplinary notions of “narrative”: Extremists’ communications are not narratives at all. They generally do not carry any significant degrees of (co-)narrativity in a linguistic or psychological sense – but rather are the opposite of a narrative, namely arguments or incoherent linguistic hybrids. In fact, not only are extremist’s communications not narrative, they actively avoid (co-)narrativity as best they can! For firstly, extremists of all sorts have always instinctively known: Narrative exchange deradicalizes which evidently is not in their interest – neither with respect to their impact on others nor with respect to the steadiness and stability of their own conviction and fervent activities. Intuitively avoiding narratives is thus both a strategic imperative and a mental defence mechanism for radicalized people – which is why they generally tend to act in profoundly anti-narrative ways.

Secondly, practice research has shown that extremists and at-risk young people generally are only little capable of engaging in (co-)narrativity if at all. They tend to lack the base social skills of participating in a dialogic process of exchanging personally lived-through experiences. Many of them have never had a chance to learn this during childhood and adolescence. Moreover, (co-)narrative interaction reflects relatively complex personal capabilities and requires a quite sensitive process of interaction with other people. This is why the target group of radicalized persons does not easily communicate on this most human level of interaction – and exchange narratives.

Out of these observations, some practitioners that were engaged in RAN and other good-practice research – especially those who follow more intense and long-term psycho-social deradicalisation approaches – agreed that what they aim for in their work, if asked to put in one phrase, can be summarized as developing the clients’ ability to narrate – i.e. support their skills to articulate first-hand lived-through experience and empower them to actively partake in (co-)narrative exchange with others.

We should never use the term “counter narrative” again

To sum up, already the first part of the term counter narrative – “counter” – has turned out to be plain unhelpful and unsuitable for our subject matter. For we came to realize – much to the surprise of most civic education and democracy pedagogy traditions – that a no-countering and no-arguments principle is key to success in deradicalization interventions. Hence, any approach that focuses on “countering”, “counter-arguing”, and/or “dismantling” extremists’ contestations will fail and even backfire, i.e. promote radicalization rather than work it through and dissolve it. Moreover, even in more general terms any methodological emphasis on “ideology, logic, fact” and other cognitive factors will not be successful. As the ISD authors have said (here above): Arguments and
evidence “may not achieve [much]” since they “can always be refuted and countered”. The only thing linguistically that cannot be refuted or countered is narratives – proper narratives that is, i.e. accounts of lived-through personal experiences.

Moreover, the second part of the term – “narrative” – has proven entirely unsuitable, too. For, here we have come to realize that violent extremists do not really use narratives in the first place – and in most cases would not even be capable to do so at all (and would need to develop narrativity proper in order to eventually work through and distance themselves from extremism and hatred). What is more, professional discourses on deradicalization, while having gotten accustomed to a metaphorical use of the term “narrative”, seem to not be aware of what a narrative really is, which methodological and institutional prerequisite need to be put in place in order to facilitate narrative exchange, and why it is that we need narrativity proper in deradicalization interventions in the first place. Quite tellingly, as a result of this profound ignorance about the nature of narratives and narrativity it is currently held that narratives could/ should be countered (by so-called “counter narratives”), which is nonsensical as such both in linguistic and psychological respects.

Hence, the term “counter narratives” is entirely fraught by errors and misconceptions – which is why we already at the outset called it a most unfortunate misnomer. The EDNA project’s approach has thus come to a quite critical – maybe even radical – terminological conclusion: We should never ever use the term “counter narrative” again! For it is wrong and unhelpful. Instead we should find a more appropriate term to cover what we mean by narrativity as the most important ingredient of efficient deradicalization work.

**Terminological errors make for wrong methods – The countering fallacy and cognitive-behavioral approaches to deradicalisation (CBT)**

In fact, not only is the term “counter narrative” unsuitable and inappropriate. Even more, it is quite confusing and misleading in methodological respects. For it suggests serious misconceptions about how deradicalisation may or may not work – and what can and cannot be done via internet and social media. Even beyond the methodological deadlock of the countering fallacy there are numerous negative effects of the current ideology of countering – and rationalizing. To give but one further example: The fact that large areas of prevent work, civic education, resilience building, and also of deradicalization are still mostly informed by strategies of logic, ideology, fact, cognition etc. and thus practice arguing, countering, rectifying, rationalizing etc. is also reflected by the widespread use of cognitive-behavioral training approaches (CBT). This especially holds true where deradicalization is practiced within statutory institutions like prisons and schools. In a way a general CBT logic still governs the whole field of prevention and intervention.

Now, if one looks at cognitive approaches to therapy, counseling, and coaching, they attempt to assist the clients to overcome personal difficulties by identifying and changing “dysfunctional thinking” and/or “maladaptive”, “distorted”, “unrealistic and unhelpful thinking”. This kind of work is done in the level of “thoughts” and patterns of “thinking”,
and it is assumed that this then has profound and sustainable effects also for the clients’ behavior and emotional responses. To this end the clients are helped to develop skills of “testing beliefs” and “assumptions” and ”modifying thoughts”.\(^8\)

Doubtlessly strategies of this sort are bound to operate mostly on the levels of ideology, logic, fact, arguments, cognition. For sure, while the context of therapy may allow for neutralizing much of the confrontational and antagonizing dynamic of countering and arguing, the mode of communication here still remains to be one that above all employs reasoning, thinking, arguments/counter arguments, etc. and is little informed by co-narrative exchange and relational dynamic. The emphasis on cognitive procedures also allows for using “computer-based programs [of] CBT techniques to help individuals challenge their patterns and beliefs and replace ‘errors in thinking such as overgeneralizing, magnifying negatives, minimizing positives and catastrophizing’ with ‘more realistic and effective thoughts, thus decreasing emotional distress and self-defeating behavior’”.\(^9\) Needless to say, in contrast to this co-narrative methods are highly dependent on direct face-to-face interaction in a commonly shared space. They do not lend themselves to work with computer-based programs.

It therefore is little surprising that CBT training approaches have not had much sustainable effect in deradicalization. One just needs to consider that deradicalization interventions are even more challenging and fragile than general psychotherapy, since in psychotherapy there is a base trust and consensus between client and therapist that the intervention is necessary, useful, and promising. This base consensus is not evident at all with violent extremist or hate crime offenders in prison interventions. It first needs to be established and then maintained. However, in a CBT framework this is hardly possible with this target group. Because it simply is not evident for any extremist – or even for any mainstream person – why it should be necessary, useful, and promising to change ones political and religious mindset.

Moreover, even with cognitive-behavioral forms of psychotherapy “there is still controversy about the degree to which the traditional cognitive elements account for the effects” and whether it is not rather other “behavioral elements such as exposure” and other more relational, experience-based, and narrative elements that brought about these effects. This, in fact, is a general theme within debates about psychotherapy impact research. There too it seems that the positive effects that many short term cognitive, behavioral, and conversational therapy approaches have seem to be due to the on-the-side narrative and relational interaction between client and therapist rather than the cognitive core techniques that the approaches stand for.

Moreover, practitioner exchange workshops within RAN and earlier research have come to the conclusion that modularized cognitive-behavioral training programs (CBT) are much less effective than widely believed, to say the least – which is not surprising since


CBT approaches are hardly compatible with the good-practice principles of open-process, relational, trust-based and narrative interactions as they have been outlined above. On the contrary, these programs are likely to unintentionally avert direct (co-)narrative exchange (between facilitators and clients and among clients in the group). Most importantly, however, they evoke obedience and compliance – and promote a Let’s-get-it-over-and-done-with attitude. Firstly CBT trainings tend to evoke such obedience in the sense of complying with the explicit – or unspoken – rules of the training exercises themselves. Secondly and more generally, they induce obedience to any prevailing institutional and situational power – which is an especially sensitive issue if the training is conducted within statutory contexts as prison, probation, schools. But most importantly, obedience and compliance in this sense is the very last thing one should aim for in any deradicalization intervention! For obedience and compliance is how extremist organisations work themselves. Plus, obedience runs counter to creating trust and personal relationship between people which, however, we need in order to promote processes of personal change.

One more recent study that emphasized the issue of obedience stated: CBT approaches “have been found to generate a ‘finishing line mentality’ with their clients” which is counter-productive for facilitating personal change. One of the interviewed deradicalization practitioner said: “Where this individual has this absolutist ideology, trying to come in with a generic toolkit (of CBT modules; H.W.), you have people that are working a finishing line mentality: ‘If I can get to the end of this, I’ll be okay’. So what happens is that they’ll sit there, take part in the exercises and put across what they think needs to be put across. What happens is that this only reinforces the absolutist mindset that ‘we’re living in the abode of war, this, what I’m taking part in is their control mechanism, I have to get through their control mechanism to get through the system’”.

Hence, looking at the widespread use of cognitive-behavioral interventions makes it even more evident how detrimental the term “counter narrative” really is – with its implications of cognitive and logic-based forms of interaction – and how it will never save us from the fact that arguments “can always be refuted and countered” and therefore “may not achieve much”. The appeal to avoid the term “counter narrative altogether is thus not merely an exercise in terminological precision. It also means to take care that we don’t make major mistakes in devising practical approaches to deradicalisation interventions – and promote the appropriate policy making.

Therefore, our conclusion is: We will never use the term “counter narrative” again and instead speak about “narrative interventions” or “deradicalizing narratives” and keep that apart from “counter messaging” or “campaigning” activities.